We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satis…ed when the status quo is the randomized allocation that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. Moreover, when utilities are convex in the allocation, we can instead satisfy participation constraints with the deterministic status quo equal to the expected equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. For quasilinear settings, these observations imply the possibility of e¢ cient bargaining when the status quo has the expected e¢ cient decision provided that the total surplus is convex in the decision. This paper supercedes the authors'earlier working paper "An Expected-E¢ cient Status Quo Allows E¢ cient Bargaining." The authors thank Ron Siegel, three anonymous referees, and Martin Osborne (the editor), and seminar participants at Cambridge, IDEI, LSE, Northwestern, Oxford, and UCL for helpful comments. Segal thanks the Toulouse Network for Information Technology for …nancial support.
Introduction
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) …rst demonstrated, in a bilateral trading setting, that participation constraints may make it impossible for parties who have private information to bargain to fully e¢ cient trade. 1 Speci…cally, they showed that when a seller owns a good that a buyer may wish to purchase, and the parties' privately-known valuations are statistically independent, under very weak conditions no e¢ cient, Bayesian incentivecompatible and budget-balanced mechanism can satisfy the parties'interim participation constraints.
Subsequently, the literature has asked whether e¢ cient bargaining can arise for some status quo allocations (that is, allocations of ex ante "property rights"). Cramton et al. This paper contributes to the literature by describing a simple status quo allocation that assures the satisfaction of participation constraints in a very general model. Namely, we study Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence."We show that in any such mechanism, interim participation constraints are satis…ed when the status quo is the randomized allocation that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. Furthermore, when utilities are convex in the allocation, we can instead satisfy participation constraints with the deterministic status quo equal to the expected 1 Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) derive a similar result for public good provision.
equilibrium allocation in the mechanism.
For quasilinear settings, these observations imply the possibility of e¢ cient bargaining when the status quo speci…es the expected e¢ cient decision provided that the total surplus is convex in the allocation. This result strictly generalizes all the preceding models for which the existence of a status quo permitting e¢ cient bargaining has been shown. In contrast to
Schweizer's result, it also describes a natural status quo that permits e¢ cient bargaining:
the expected e¢ cient decision. Moreover, the proof of the result is surprisingly simple.
Our general results apply more broadly, however, to both non-quasilinear environments and to implementation of ex post ine¢ cient outcomes. For example, pre-commitment to ex post ine¢ cient outcomes may be desirable in strategic settings, when incentives for ex ante investments need to be created, or when distributional or risk-sharing concerns are present.
The General Model and Result
Let Y be the set of feasible allocations, assumed to be a measure space (an allocation may also describe monetary transfers). Let I be a …nite set of agents. Each agent i 2 I privately observes his type i , which is a realization of a random variable e i in a measure space i .
The agents'types are stochastically independent of each other. We let = 1 : : : I . Each agent i 2 I is an expected utility maximizer, with a measurable Bernoulli utility settings in which CC holds will be described in Section 3.2 below.
The Bayesian incentive-compatibility constraints in direct revelation mechanism take the form
In general, we allow status quo allocationsỹ that are random variables on Y and independent of the true state e . The agents'(interim) participation constraints then take the form
In some cases, instead of a randomized status quo we can use a deterministic one, which implements a given allocation from Y with probability one.
Proposition 1 Suppose that mechanism satis…es IC and CC. Then (a) Mechanism also satis…es IR when the status quo is the randomized allocationỹ that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation ( e ) in the mechanism.
(b) If, in addition, the allocation space Y is a convex set in a topological vector space and the Bernoulli utility function u i (y; ) of each agent i 2 I is convex in the allocation y 2 Y for each state 2 , then mechanism also satis…es IR with the deterministic status quo equal to the expected equilibrium allocation in the mechanism, E[ ( e )].
Proof. For part (a), for all i 2 I and i 2 i , letting e e = ( e e i ; e e i ) be a random variable equal in distribution to e and independent of it, we can write obtain a randomized status quo that yields the same distribution over allocations as the equilibrium distribution of the mechanism and satis…es all of the participation constraints,
proving Proposition 1(a). Proposition 1(b) allows us to replace the randomized status quo with its expectation when the agents are weakly risk-loving with respect to the allocation.
Note that the status quo constructed in Proposition 1(a) satis…es any constraints that are satis…ed by the mechanism itself. The same holds for the deterministic status quo constructed in Proposition 1(b), for constraints that are state-independent and convex, such as budget balance, resource non-wastefulness, or bounds on consumption or transfers.
Application to Bargaining in Quasilinear Environments
We now apply the results to bargaining in quasilinear environments, and in particular to the possibility of e¢ cient bargaining, as examined in the literature discussed in the introduction. For this purpose, we let the allocation space be Y = X R I , so that an allocation y = (x; t) consists of a nonmonetary decision x 2 X and a pro…le t 2 R I of monetary transfers to the agents. We say that a transfer vector t 2 R I is budget-balanced if P i2I t i = 0. The utility of each agent i takes the quasilinear form u i ((x; t) ; ) = v i (x; )+t i . We assume that X is a measure space and that the functions v i are measurable and uniformly bounded (i.e., sup i2I;x2X; 2 jv i (x; )j < 1). The total surplus from decision x in state is s (x; ) P i2I v i (x; ). A direct revelation mechanism in this setting can be written as = h ; i, where : ! X is the decision rule and : ! R I is the transfer rule. We restrict both functions to be measurable and the transfers to be bounded. 3 Note that the satisfaction of property CC in the mechanism is entirely determined by the decision rule.
The literature on e¢ cient bargaining is interested in e¢ cient decision rules
In line with the results of Section 2, we begin with the more general question concerning the possibility of implementing an arbitrary given decision rule in a mechanism that is IC, IR, and in addition satis…es the budget-balance condition
Following the insight of Arrow (1979) and d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979), starting with any IC mechanism h ; i we can construct another IC mechanism h ; i that also satis…es (BB), by taking the new transfers to be
Furthermore, if the decision rule satis…es CC, then Proposition 1(a) yields a randomized status quo for which mechanism ( ; ) also satis…es IR. Finally, under convexity of agents' utilities in the decision and of the decision space X, Proposition 1(b) implies that IR can be satis…ed with a deterministic status quo (x;t) specifying decisionx = E[ ( e )]. Note that since the mechanism ( ; ) satis…es BB, the status quo transferst obtained in this way are budget-balanced as well.
Here we establish a stronger result: the deterministic status quox = E[ ( e )] can be used under the weaker assumption that only the total surplus s (x; ) is convex in the decision. We do so in a manner designed to facilitate comparison to the existing literature, which is discussed further in Section 4. We begin with the following de…nition:
De…nition 2 Status quo decisionx 2 X sustains decision rule in bargaining if there exists an IC BB mechanism h ; i that satis…es IR for some status quo allocation (x;t) with budget-balanced transferst 2 R I . Status quo decisionx 2 X permits e¢ cient bargaining if it sustains an e¢ cient decision rule in bargaining.
Note that it does not matter which budget-balanced status quo transferst are used in the de…nition, since the mechanism's transfer rule can always be adjusted to^ i ( ) = i ( ) t i to preserve BB and IC and satisfy IR for the status quo (x; 0). Hence for de…niteness we focus on status quos with no transfers.
Given an IC mechanism h ; i, for anyx 2 X and^ = (^ 1 ; : : : ;^ I ) 2 , de…ne
The function h ; i (x;^ ) can be interpreted as the expected pro…t of an intermediary who runs the mechanism h ; i, incurring expected cost E[ i ( e )] for each agent i, and charges
makes his type^ i indi¤erent between participating in the mechanism and getting the status quo (x; 0). The function h ; i (x) is therefore the expected pro…t of an intermediary who runs mechanism h ; i with status quo (x; 0) and charges the maximal participation fees that assure participation of all types.
We begin with a lemma that has a number of (more restrictive) precedents for e¢ cient decision rules:
4 Lemma 1 If h ; i is an IC mechanism andx 2 X satis…es h ; i (x) 0, then status quo decisionx sustains decision rule in bargaining.
Proof. Let ( ; ) be the IC BB mechanism with transfers (2). For each i 2 I and each where, for all i 2 I,
Mechanism h ;^ i inherits IC and BB from mechanism ( ; ), and satis…es IR for status quo (x; 0) by construction of K i and the fact that
(The …rst equality holds since transfers satisfy (BB), and the second since by (2) we have
) We now use this lemma along with Proposition 1 to establish a possibility result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the decision space X is a convex set in a topological vector space and the total surplus s (x; ) is convex in the decision x 2 X for each state 2 .
Then if decision rule is implementable in an IC mechanism that satis…es CC, the status quo decision equal to the expected equilibrium decision E[ ( e )] sustains in bargaining.
Proof. Let h ; i be an IC and CC mechanism, and let (e x; e ) be a random variable equal in distribution to ( ( e ); ( e )) and independent of it. The convexity of s (x; ) in x implies that for any^ 2 , h ; i (x;^ ) is concave inx, and therefore by Jensen's inequality,
by Proposition 1(a), each summation term is nonnegative. Apply Lemma 1.
Application to Private Values
In the case of private values, in which utilities take the form v i (x; i ), any e¢ cient decision rule (1) can be implemented in a dominant-strategy incentive-compatible direct mechanism (VCG mechanism) = h ; i with transfers Lemma 2 Suppose that i R for each i 2 I. Then (a) Any decision rule such that for each i 2 I, v i ( (
Application to Interdependent Values
5 Below we use the concepts of (strictly) increasing di¤erences, supermodularity, and lattices, whose de…nitions can be found in Topkis (1998). 6 The mathematical observation underlying Lemma 2(b) has been noted in the economic literature, e.g.,
by Milgrom and Roberts (1995, p.186 ). Our proof is provided for the sake of completeness and to illustrate its connection to the ideas of mechanism design.
(b) Any mechanism h ; i such that for all i; j 2 I with j 6 = i, v i ( (
Proof
Putting these transfer rules together (for all i 2 i and all i 2 I) yields a mechanism h ; i that is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible and therefore IC. 
Now, let e e j be a random variable with the same distribution as e j but independent of it.
Taking a subset T In fig of agents, substitute = ( i ; e i ) and 0 = ( 0 i ; e T ; e e In (T [fig) ) in the above inequality, and take expectations to obtain (note that the expectations of transfers cancel out since random variables e e j and e j have the same distribution and are independent of the other variables) Part (a) of Lemma 2, which states that increasing di¤erences in agents' utilities between their true and reported types ensure implementability, is fairly well known. The derivation of part (b) applies the same approach to hypothetical situations in which agent i observes and reports the type j of another agent j 6 = i rather than his own type. Increasing di¤erences between the report 0 j and true type j in agent i's utility imply that his truthful reporting of j could be sustained by some transfers. In turn, using an observation of Rahman (2010, Theorem 1), this implies that agent i's expected nonmonetary utility could not be improved by any randomized "undetectable deviation," i.e., deviation to a randomized reporting strategy in which his report 0 j has the same distribution as the true type j . This explains the satisfaction of CC in this setting.
Lemma 2 together with Proposition 2 yield:
Corollary 2 Suppose that the decision space X is a convex set in a topological vector space and the total surplus s (x; ) is convex in the decision x 2 X for each state 2 , and that i R for each i 2 I. Then for any decision rule such that for all i; j 2 I, v i ( ( 0 ) ; ) has increasing di¤erences in ( 0 j ; j ) 2 j j for all 0 j ; j 2 j , the status quo decision equal to the expected equilibrium decision E[ ( e )] sustains in bargaining.
The following two examples describe some settings with interdependent values in which the desired increasing di¤erence conditions are satis…ed by an e¢ cient decision rule, so that Corollary 2 establishes the possibility of e¢ cient bargaining:
, where x i is interpreted as agent i's consumption of a good whose total supply is 1 and, for all i 2 I, i R and v i (x; ) = i ( ) x i where i : ! R is a di¤erentiable function. Consider …rst the case of I = 2, and suppose that for each i = 1; 2, This conclusion extends to the case of I > 2 agents whose values take the separable
In this case, e¢ ciency (1) means that i ( ) > 0 only for i 2 arg max j2J [g j ( j ) h j ( j )]. Thus, when g 
Remarks
In this section we make a few remarks concentrating on the special case of quasilinear environments with private values studied in Section 3, which has been the focus of most of the literature.
Comparison to Schweizer' s (2006) Proposition 2
Our derivation of Proposition 2 can be interpreted as follows. Fix an IC and CC mechanism h ; i and consider the zero-sum game in which an "intermediary"chooses the status quo decisionx 2 X to maximize h ; i (x;^ ) in (3) and an "adversary" chooses the "critical types"^ 2 to minimize it. According to Lemma 1, if status quo decisionx guarantees the intermediary a nonnegative payo¤ regardless of the adversary's action, then it sustains decision rule in bargaining. Now, by randomizing over status quo decisions with the same distribution as the equilibrium decision rule ( e ) the intermediary guarantees himself a nonnegative expected payo¤, since by Proposition 1(a) the intermediary's expected pro…t on each agent -given by the expectation of the corresponding summation term in (3) -would be nonnegative at any^ 2 . Finally, if the intermediary's payo¤ is concave inx
[which is true if s (x; ) is convex] and his choice set X is convex, the randomization can be replaced with its expectation E[ ( e )] without reducing the intermediary's expected payo¤.
Therefore, by Lemma 1, the status quo E[ ( e )] sustains decision rule in bargaining.
Schweizer (2006) focuses on the private-value setting and an e¢ cient decision rule (1), which is then implementable in the VCG mechanism = h ; i with transfers (4). In this case, letting S ( ) max x2X s (x; ) ; the intermediary's payo¤ (3) can be written as
He makes a number of assumptions to ensure that the resulting simultaneous zero-sum game between the intermediary and the adversary has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium -a "saddle point" (x ;^ ). In this case, strategyx is the intermediary's "maximin" strategy and guarantees him at least the saddle-point payo¤ (x ;^ ) regardless of the adversary's action [Rockafellar (1970) ]. Schweizer then shows that the saddle-point payo¤ is nonnegative, a conclusion that can also be seen from the observation that the intermediary cannot improve upon the saddle-point payo¤ by any mixed strategy, in particular by the randomization ( e ), which would guarantee him a nonnegative payo¤ by Proposition 1(a).
Hence, by Lemma 1, status quox permits e¢ cient bargaining.
To ensure the existence of a saddle point, Schweizer makes stronger assumptions than those of our Proposition 2. In addition, he assumes that the total surplus is linear in [which ensures that the payo¤ (5) is convex in the adversary's action^ ], that the adversary's choice set is convex, and that the sets X and are compact subsets of Euclidean spaces, and also makes some continuity assumptions. 9 Our approach dispenses with the extra assumptions -in particular, we allow for in…nite-dimensional decisions or types, non-convex or non-compact type spaces, and utility functions that are nonlinear or discontinuous. The only indispensable assumptions prove to be convexity of the total surplus in the decision and of the decision set X (and even these assumptions are not needed if a randomized status quo is allowed). A second and perhaps more important advantage of our approach is our explicit description of a natural status quo that permits e¢ cient bargaining: the expected e¢ cient decision. 10 On the other hand, Schweizer's saddle-point status quo or, more generally, the "maximin" status quo, which maximizes the intermediary's expected pro…t, is of some independent interest. This expected pro…t-maximizing status quo generally di¤ers from the expected equilibrium decision, as we illustrate in Example 3 below. For analyzing this example, we write the two best-response conditions characterizing a saddle point (x ;^ ) of the intermediary's payo¤ (3) in a general mechanism h ; i for private-value settings in the following form:
x 2 arg min x2X s(x;^ ):
Condition (6) says that the adversary chooses each agent i's critical type^ i to minimize his net expected surplus over the status quo decisionx in mechanism h ; i, while (7) says that the intermediary chooses status quo decisionx to minimize the total surplus at the critical types^ .
Example 3 Suppose that I = 2, each e i is distributed on i = [0; 1] according to a strictly increasing c.d.f. F i , the decision space is X = (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 R 2 + : x 1 + x 2 = 1 , and v i (x; i ) = i x i . Consider any e¢ cient decision rule (1), which has i ( ) = 1 whenever i > i . In this setting there is a unique saddle point, which is found as follows: Given a status quo decisionx = (x 1 ;x 2 ), condition (6) is satis…ed only by the types^ i whose 10 The saddle-point status quo decision b x does o¤er one advantage when mechanism h ; i is dominantstrategy incentive compatible (as is the VCG mechanism considered by Schweizer): By using transferŝ
the intermediary guarantees a nonnegative budget surplus not just in expectation but in every state . Indeed, by the saddlepoint condition (7) below and the dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility of h ; i, P i2I^ i ( jx ) P i2I^ i ( j ( )) 0 for all 2 . Furthermore, unlike the balanced-budget mechanism constructed in the proof of Lemma 1, the mechanism h ;^ i inherits the dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of h ; i.
Note, however, that the mechanism h ;^ i would generally satisfy all of the participation constraints with status quo decisionx only in expectation, not in the ex post sense.
expected consumption equalsx i (any other type can obtain a positive interim net expected utility by pretending to be type^ i ). With the e¢ cient decision rule, this means that 
Deterministic Status Quo without Convexity
When the assumptions of Proposition 2 -convexity of the total surplus s(x; ) in the decision x and of the decision set X -do not hold, there may not exist a deterministic status quo decision that sustains an IC implementable decision rule in bargaining. To understand these settings, we …rst note that for certain classical settings, a converse to Lemma 1 also holds: If this value is negative, the mechanism cannot satisfy (BB). 12 Then the e¢ cient decision rule is ( ) = P i2I i , and S( ) = 1 2
Given a status quo decisionx, (6) is solved by type^ i (x) =x for each i, and using the statistical independence of agents'types we can calculate:
This function is strictly concave inx and is maximized atx = 0, the expected e¢ cient decision, which yields value zero. Thus, by Lemma 3, the expected e¢ cient decision E[ ( e )] = 0 is the unique status quo decision that permits e¢ cient bargaining.
However, as the discussion at the end of the previous subsection indicates, an expected e¢ cient decision generally does not maximizes the intermediary's expected pro…t. As a result, with concave payo¤s e¢ ciency may be possible for some status quo decision, but not with an expected e¢ cient decision. 11 For other examples with a nonconvex decision space X in which there is no deterministic status quo permitting e¢ cient bargaining, see Ornelas and Turner (2007) , Turner (2007) . 12 Where kxk 2 = x x. The conclusion of this example extends in any setting in which the agents'utilities are linear-quadratic in ( ; x) and the total surplus s (x; ) is strictly concave in x. Indeed, any such setting can be transformed into the model in the example using a¢ ne transformations of x and and adding baseline decision-dependent transfers.
Example 5 Let I = 2, and let i = X = [0; 1] for i = 1; 2. Suppose also that v 1 (x; 1 ) = 
Relation to Hold-Up Models
Suppose agents …rst choose unobservable ex ante investments, with each agent i's private investment choice a i 2 A i determining the distribution of his type e i . (Any investment costs can be subsumed into utilities.) Let a = (a 1 ; :::; a I ) be an e¢ cient investment pro…le, i.e., maximizing the expected total surplus E[S( e )ja]. Rogerson (1992, Proposition 2) shows that if following the realizations of agents'types they participate in an "expected externality"mechanism in which all expectations are taken conditional on the e¢ cient investment pro…le a , this pro…le is sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the ex ante investment game.
Using our Corollary 1, the mechanism can also satisfy the interim participation constraints (if quitting is possible after investments are taken and agents observe their own types) when the status quo equals the expected e¢ cient decision E[ ( e )ja ]. (More generally, any status quo satisfying the condition in Lemma 1 can be used.) Note that each agent i's IR and IC constraints will be satis…ed for any realization of his type i , provided that the other agents have made e¢ cient investments a i . Thus, the strategies in which each agent i invests a i and then participates in the mechanism and reports truthfully for each realized i form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the mechanism. In an optimistic scenario, we could think of the agents specifying only the expected e¢ cient decision as the status quo in the ex ante contract -if they then expect to bargain according to the mechanism, they will choose e¢ cient investments and achieve an e¢ cient allocation.
The use of an expected e¢ cient decision as the status quo is reminiscent of the result of Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) , who show that in a two-agent hold-up model in which agents engage in full-information Nash bargaining over trade upon observing nonveri…able investments and values, such a status quo sustains e¢ cient investments in equilibrium, provided that payo¤s satisfy a separability condition. Our result, however, is formally quite distinct: e.g., the investments here are unobservable, our bargaining mechanism is quite di¤erent from Nash bargaining, and the assumptions of convexity and separability are not nested.
